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Civil Money Penalties Law of 1981: A New Effort To
Confront Fraud and Abuse in Federal Health Care
Programs
Richard P. Kusserow *
This article is intended to introduce you to the Civil Money
Penalties Law of 1981.1 This new law will more fully enable the De-
partment of Health and Human Services (HHS) to protect the
multi-billion dollar health care financing programs against unscru-
pulous persons and organizations who defraud or attempt to abuse
these programs.2
On December 30, 1982, the Department of Health and Human
Services published proposed regulations3 specifying procedures for
implementing the authority to impose certain civil money penalties
for persons convicted of committing specified fraudulent activity as
provided by section 2015 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 19814 as amended by section 137(b)(26) of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.5 The regulations will allow the
Department to administratively impose civil money penalties and as-
sessments for filing false or otherwise improper claims in the Medi-
care, Medicaid, or Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant
programs. This new law is expected to be fully implemented on or
before June 30, 1983.
I. Background: Abuse in Health Care Programs
In late 1976, Congress enacted legislation 6 creating the Office of
• Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services. B.A. 1963,
U.C.L.A., M.S. 1964, California State University at Los Angeles.
1 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a (West Supp. 1982).
2 For general statements on the scope of fraud in government benefit programs, see
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY
THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (1978) (estimating that one to ten
percent of federal funds in Medicaid, food stamps, and Defense Department spending is lost
through fraud); N.Y. Times, May 17, 1982, at 11, col. 2 (fraud in benefit programs costs from
$2.5 to $25 billion per year).
3 47 Fed. Reg. 58,309-14 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 101.100-101.131). These
regulations are subject to change after the comment period.
4 Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981).
5 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
6 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3521-3527 (West 1977).
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Inspector General. This organization was designed to make a signifi-
cant contribution toward eliminating fraud, waste, and abuse from
nearly 300 expensive health and entitlement programs in the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services.
Today, the number one priority of the Office of Inspector Gen-
eral is stopping health care providers who defraud or abuse Medicare
and Medicaid programs. Spending for direct health care services has
grown from $5 billion in 1965 to $72 billion in fiscal year 1983. This
year, the Department will spend as much every month in Medicare
and Medicaid as was spent during the entire year of 1967. Ameri-
cans, in contrast, will spend nearly $300 billion a year on health care,
making it the nation's third largest industry.
Medicare and Medicaid together represent the second largest
expenditure in the Department of Health and Human Services.
These two programs constitute approximately 25 percent of the De-
partment's expenditures and provide assistance to 29 million and 22
million beneficiaries, respectively. Medicare ($55 billion) and Medi-
caid ($17 billion) are major targets for both management improve-
ment and prevention of fraud and abuse.
The dramatic growth of these two programs has been concur-
rent with the growth in the number of health care providers who
have learned to abuse the programs by submitting false, fraudulent,
or otherwise improper claims-a problem unforeseen when the legis-
lation was in the planning stages. In fact, health care programs have
grown so large and so fast that fraud and abuse have risen to epi-
demic proportions.
Not surprisingly, health providers convicted of fraud are rarely
willing to accept the guilt of their wrongdoings. A variety of expla-
nations and excuses are routinely offered. The following case exam-
ples illustrate the scope and magnitude of criminal activity in the
health provider area.
A well-known cardiologist and author pled guilty to filing nearly
$1 million in false Medicare, Social Security, and worker's compensa-
tion claims. He was sentenced to seven years' incarceration, five
years' probation, and fined $300,000. In a separate civil matter, this
same physician and his wife settled a false claims suit for $500,000,
the largest amount under the False Claims Act in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.
Many cases result from filing fraudulent Medicaid cost reports.
In one case, the owner of nine nursing homes misrepresented the
number of employees providing direct care to nursing home patients.
[Uune 19831
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The owner kept a dual set of records and fraudulently claimed an
overpayment of approximately $1.3 million. Though he agreed to
repay this amount as part of the plea bargain, he was given a five
year prison sentence and was fined $50,000.
In New Hampshire, a pharmacist pled guilty to five counts of
Medicaid fraud. He was charged with generic substitution, unau-
thorized dispensing, and billing for services not rendered. The court
sentenced him to five years' probation, fined him $1,000, and ordered
him to repay $3,000 to the state's Medicaid program. The pharma-
cist was also suspended from practice.
Fraudulent cost reports are unwittingly falsified by nursing
homes and hospitals because of frauds perpetrated by contractors.
An Office of Inspector General surveillance of a Colorado speech
therapist documented that she was not performing all the services she
was reporting to her contract employer. The employer in turn billed
numerous nursing homes, causing them to submit erroneous cost re-
ports. In a plea bargaining agreement, the therapist pled guilty and
agreed to repay $25,000. She was sentenced to five years' probation
and fined $12,500.
For a variety of reasons, criminal prosecutions are not mandated
in each and every health provider fraud case. 7 Therefore, the Office
of Inspector General is taking an active role in both pursuing crimi-
nal investigations and in eliminating all administrative loopholes
which foster fraud, waste, and abuse. In this new proactive role,
maximum resources are directed against the civil and criminal
abuses occurring in these programs.
Estimates suggest that up to ten percent of all Medicaid and
Medicare claims contain false information. 8 Congressional response
to the problem culminated in the administrative imposition of civil
money penalties through enactment of the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1981. President Reagan signed the Act into law on
August 13, 1981.
Understanding the import of this new law is vital to the entire
health care community. Until enactment of the Civil Money Penal-
ties legislation, the federal government had to rely upon the False
Claims Act or criminal proceedings in order to compel restitution of
7 For example, the United States Attorney may determine that a fraud case is unsuita-
ble for prosecution because it increases an already crowded docket; it does not warrant the
investment of time and effort to acquire the necessary expertise in Medicare-Medicaid law; or
the number of counts or amount of money involved is insufficient to warrant criminal
proceedings.
8 Se note 2 supra.
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funds falsely or improperly claimed under HHS health care financ-
ing programs. The Civil Money Penalties Law was designed to reach
not only those health providers who intentionally submit false or
otherwise improper claims but also those who "should have known"
they were doing so. It will not be used to harass health providers
who make honest mistakes.
The Civil Money Penalties Law is more than just a deterrent; it
encourages health providers to check the accuracy of information on
claim forms submitted by them or on their behalf by nurses, clerks,
or billing services. Long-standing and extensive patterns of possible
fraud can now be detected and analyzed on a much larger scale, and
cases of fraud will be acted upon with greater frequency than in the
past. In addition, large sums of money improperly claimed can now
be recovered.
Presently, false or otherwise improper claims may be subject to a
variety of criminal, civil, and administrative governmental action.
False claims that are not made the subject of criminal prosecution
can still be handled civilly under the Federal False Claims Act, 9 or a
state equivalent. By terms of a Memorandum of Understanding
with the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and
Human Services will first submit cases to the Department of Justice.
The Department of Justice will have the option, in each case, to seek
an indictment or to file a civil action under the False Claims Act. If
these options are not exercised, the Department of Health and
Human Services can then begin administrative proceedings under
the Civil Money Penalties Law.
The Civil Money Penalties Law contains no statute of limita-
tions on its face. The Department .intends, however, to propose pen-
alties for a five-year period beginning with occurrence of the
violation. The law also allows the Department to impose fines for
false claims filed before enactment of the legislation. Since it is not a
criminal statute, constitutional issues regarding ex post facto laws do
not apply. However, due process considerations do apply. We in-
tend, therefore, to follow the substantive law of the Federal False
Claims Act for violations occurring before enactment of the Civil
Money Penalties Law.
II. Existing Law Prior to the Civil Money Penalties Law
Prior to passage of the Civil Money Penalties Law, federal law
9 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-235 (1976).
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established criminal penalties for persons convicted of committing
specified fraudulent acts under Medicare and Medicaid. Such fraud-
ulent activities included filing false claims, misrepresenting an insti-
tution's qualifications so it can qualify as a provider, and soliciting,
receiving, or offering kickbacks, bribes, or rebates.' 0 Such acts are
punishable by a maximum fine of $25,000, five years' imprisonment,
or both. Prior law also required the Secretary to suspend from Medi-
care any practitioner convicted of a criminal offense related to that
individual's participation in the delivery of covered medical care or
services. It similarly reached any institutional provider whose man-
aging employee had been so convicted. In both cases, the state Medi-
caid agency was required to suspend the physician or provider from
the Medicaid program." The law also allowed the Secretary to ex-
clude from Medicare individual practitioners or providers who: 1)
knowingly or willfully made or caused to be made any false state-
ments in an application for payment; 2) submitted excessive bills; or
3) furnished services in excess of need. 2
Although the Department of Health and Human Services for-
wards cases of potential fraud to the Department of Justice for prose-
cution, many are not brought to trial. United States Attorneys
frequently decline to accept Medicare and Medicaid cases for a
number of reasons: the backlog of cases; a lack of sufficient expertise
in Medicare-Medicaid law not warranting the investment of time
and effort necessary to acquire the expertise to prosecute; or an insuf-
ficient number of counts or amount of money to warrant criminal
proceedings. None of these examples imply the nonexistence of fraud
or lack of culpability on the part of the alleged offender; they only
indicate the United States Attorney's unwillingness to accept many
cases because they appear to be unsuitable for prosecution.
Prior to the Civil Money Penalties Law, when a decision was
made not to accept a case for prosecution, the only recourse for the
government was attempting to recover the overpayment involved.
But even if recovery was successful, the offender enjoyed penalty-free
use of federal funds for a period of time. The prior law, therefore,
had obvious gaps in its coverage that the Civil Money Penalties Act
was intended to close.
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn, 1396h (1976, Supp. 1 1977 & Supp. 11 1978).
11 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7(a) (West Supp. 1982).
12 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(d) (1976, Supp. 1 1977 & Supp. 11 1978).
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III. Major Provisions of the Civil Money Penalties Law
A. Basis for Civil Money Penalties and Assessments
The Department of Health and Human Services derives its au-
thority to impose a civil money penalty for improper claims from
section 1128A of the Social Security Act, as supplemented by section
2105 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, and as
amended by section 137(b) (26) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act of 1982.13 In addition to being able to impose a civil
money penalty of up to $2,000 for each improper claim, the Depart-
ment may also assess up to twice the amount claimed against any
person (including individuals, organizations, and other entities) who
presents (or causes to be presented) a claim for reimbursement under
the Medicare, Medicaid, or Maternal and Child Health Services
Block Grant program where the claim is for an item or service that
the person knew or had reason to know was false or improper.' 4 Spe-
cifically, the provision applies to any claim for an item or service that
was not provided as claimed, or for which reimbursement is prohib-
ited because the person has been excluded or suspended from partici-
pation in the program, or because the services or charges were in
excess of certain statutory standards. The penalty and assessment
may also be imposed where a submitted request for payment violates
the permissible charges in either a Medicare assignment or an agree-
ment with a state's Medicaid agency.
The proposed regulation provision covering the circumstances
which subject a person to civil money penalties and assessments is the
same as the statutory provision.' 5 In addition, the proposed regula-
tions provide that, where more than one person is responsible for
filing the claim, all persons may be held jointly liable for any assess-
ment.'6 Both the statute and the proposed regulations include sus-
pension from the Medicare or Medicaid programs as an additional
sanction that may be imposed against persons who are liable for a
penalty. ' 7
13 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a (West Supp. 1982). The proposed regulations specify that the
Inspector General of HHS will make the initial proposal to impose a penalty, assessment, or
suspension. 47 Fed. Reg. 58,312 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.109(a)).
14 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(a) (West Supp. 1982).
15 47 Fed. Reg. 58,311 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.102(a)).
16 Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.102(b)).
17 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7(b) (West Supp. 1982).
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B. Hearing and Appeal Rights
Persons against whom any of the statutory sanctions are sought
have the right to a hearing and judicial review of any final HHS
determination. The proposed regulations provide: an opportunity
for a hearing before an administrative law judge on any issues per-
taining to a proposed penalty, assessment, or suspension; an opportu-
nity to appeal the judge's decision to the Secretary; and an
opportunity to seek judicial review of a final agency determination.
The person against whom any of these sanctions are proposed
would have thirty days to either accept imposition of the sanctions
with or without supplying reasons for modifying them, or request a
hearing.18 The Inspector General may extend the period for good
cause. 19 Unless a hearing is requested, a person would have no fur-
ther appeal rights.20 Hearings would be recorded,21 and the parties
would have the right to be represented by counsel, to present evi-
dence and witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present oral
arguments and written briefs.22 The administrative law judge would
be required to issue his decision within sixty days after either the
hearing or the deadline for submitting post-hearing briefs, whichever
is later.23 The judge's decision would become final and binding on
the parties thirty days after notice of the decision is received, unless a
party files written exceptions to the decision within that time.24
Where exceptions are filed, the matter would be referred for re-
view25 to the Secretary or his designee. There would be no right to
appear personally before the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary or
his designee would be final unless, within sixty days of being notified
of the decision, the person against whom sanctions are being imposed
seeks judicial review.26 Under the statute, reviews of penalties and
assessments are by the appropriate court of appeals27 while reviews of
suspension are by the appropriate district court.28
18 47 Fed. Reg. 58,312 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.109).
19 Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.109(c)).
20 Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.110).
21 Id. at 58,313 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.122).
22 Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.116).
23 Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.125(a)).
24 Id. (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.125(d)).
25 Id at 58,313-34 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.1250)).
26 Id at 58,314 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.125(j)(5)); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(d)
(West Supp. 1982).
27 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(d) (West Supp. 1982).
28 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West Supp. 1982).
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C. Calculating the Penalty, Assessment, and Length of Suspension
The statute requires the Secretary, when determining the
amount of any penalty or assessment, to take into account the nature
of the claims, the circumstances under which they were presented, a
claimant's level of culpability, any prior offenses, and his financial
condition, as well as other matters that justice may require. 29 The
proposed regulations include guidelines describing those circum-
stances which we would consider mitigating, resulting in a reduced
penalty and assessment, and those circumstances which we would
consider aggravating, resulting in a higher penalty and assessment. 30
The proposed regulation also requires that the length of suspensions
takes into account the amount of the penalties and assessments.3'
D. Collections
Where a person does not voluntarily pay the amount owed as a
penalty and assessment, the Department may initiate a civil action in
district court to recover the funds. Furthermore, the statute and reg-
ulations permit deducting the amount owed by the person from any
sums owed to the person by the United States or a state agency.32
E. Efective Date
The proposed regulations would apply to any false or improper
claim, regardless of when the claim was filed. However, in the case of
a claim filed before the date of enactment of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, August 13, 1981, the government's bur-
den of proof would be higher; the government would have to show
that the person would have been liable for penalties under the False
Claims Act.33 These additional requirements have been added to as-
sure that no new substantive law or standards will be applied to
claims filed before August 13, 1981.
IV. Penalties and Assessments
The potential exists for imposing substantial penalties and as-
sessments. The law calls for a civil money penalty of not more than
$2,000 for each item or service falsely or improperly claimed.34 The
29 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(c) (West Supp. 1982).
30 47 Fed. Reg. 58,311-12 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.106).
31 Id. at 58,312 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.107).
32 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(e) (West Supp. 1982).
33 47 Fed. Reg. 58,312 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 101.114).
34 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(a) (West Supp. 1982).
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amount to be imposed will be determined initially by the Inspector
General, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. The amount will be fixed by the administrative law judge
after a full hearing. A number of factors, both mitigating and aggra-
vating, will be considered when determining the penalty amount.35
Such factors include: the nature, number, and dollar size of the
claims and the circumstances under which they were presented; the
claimant's level of culpability, whether intentional or negligent; any
prior offenses; his financial condition; and such other matters as jus-
tice may require.3 6
In addition to the penalty of not more than $2,000, an assess-
ment may be imposed of not more than twice the amount claimed
for each item or service. This assessment is in lieu of damages sus-
tained because of similar claims by either the United States or a state
agency. 37 As a general rule, the Department will seek the maximum
assessment of twice the amount claimed.
Damages are generally defined as the difference between what
the provider received and what he was legally entitled to receive.
Determining precise damages is often difficult and always time con-
suming. The Civil Money Penalties Law avoids this problem by bas-
ing the assessment on the amount of the claim.
V. Cases Suitable for Civil Money Penalties Action
Presently, there is no case history interpreting the Civil Money
Penalties Law. There are, however, six broad categories of fraud and
abuse cases suitable for action under the law.
The first category includes cases where an investigation has been
conducted but closed prior to its referral to the Department of Jus-
tice for possible criminal prosecution. Examples include cases with
small overpayments not great enough to warrant criminal prosecu-
tion or cases lacking sufficient criminal intent to sustain a criminal
conviction. The second group involves those cases that have been
investigated and referred to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution but declined because of the workload of the United
States Attorney, the small number of potential counts, or because the
amount of overpayment does not justify the cost of criminal prosecu-
tion. Third are those cases accepted by the Department of Justice for
criminal prosecution but resulting in either no conviction or a con-
35 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a(c) (West Supp. 1982).
36 See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
37 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320(a)-7a(a) (West Supp. 1982).
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viction on only a portion of the counts originally brought. The
fourth group includes those cases where the subject is convicted of a
criminal offense but the Department of Justice declines civil action.
The fifth group of cases involves state court convictions for Medicaid
or Title V-related offenses where the Department of Justice plans no
civil action. Finally, the Civil Money Penalties Law should cover
cases where a state investigation of a Medicaid or Title V case fails to
produce a state prosecution, and the Department of Justice refuses to
take civil action despite an indication of federal civil fraud potential.
VI. Conclusion
Since its inception, actions by the Office of Inspector General
have resulted in the conviction of over 1,200 health providers. Yet,
criminal convictions have not proven to be a totally effective deter-
rent. Rarely does a convicted health care provider have to face the
likelihood of imprisonment. This is particularly true of physicians.
Furthermore, prosecutions have not resulted in the total recovery of
those substantial program dollars lost through fraud and abuse.
The Civil Money Penalties Law gives the Inspector General a
vitally needed weapon to combat health providers who defraud or
attempt to abuse the programs. It is a formidable deterrent, essential
to convince a would-be criminal that the punishment outweighs the
crime. The Civil Money Penalties Law will allow us to strike the
crooked provider where it hurts most-in the pocketbook.
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